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Annual reports disclosure of multinational corporations (MNCs) is subject to
various domestic as well as international users requirements. Voluntary
disclosures act as one of the ways that these MNCs can use to overcome the
gap between information provided in annual reports and information
expectation by these users. This study examines the relationship between the
level of information disclosures and some of the MNCs characteristics. The
level of disclosures is based on the amount of the voluntary disclosure
information gathered from annual reports of listed MNCs on Bursa Malaysia
across six industries. Overall, the results show that level of voluntary
information disclosures is positively related to size of the company and the
type of audit. Meanwhile, the level of multinationality is significantly related
to the level of projected information disclosures. We also found MNCs in
particular industries (e.g. construction industry) seem particularly inclined
to provide certain information (e.g. summary of history results). Additional
tests show that the level of multinationality and the number of countries where
the products were exported jointly determine the level of voluntary disclosure
in MNCs. Thus, these results indicate that the factors explaining voluntary
annual report disclosures differ by the types of voluntary information presented
in annual reports.
Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, multinational corporations (MNCs)
Data: 2003 annual reports
Introduction
International business and global expansion are now driven by more than 60,000
multinational corporations (MNCs) with over 800,000 subsidiaries around the
world (Luo, 2002).  Their foreign assets amounted to USD$2 trillion in 2000,
hiring over six million people around the world (Luo, 2002).  The concentrations
of these businesses are mainly in electronics and electrical equipment,
automobiles, petroleum, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.
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MNCs are exposed to various accounting and reporting requirements, both national and
international requirements (Meek, Roberts and Gray, 1995). Voluntary disclosures act as
one of the ways that these MNCs can use to overcome the international diversity in
accounting principles (Choi and Levich 1990 in Meek et al., 1995). Additional information
from voluntary disclosures would help users to better understand the company and its
operating environment (Meek et al., 1995). In this regard, voluntary disclosure is defined
as any additional piece of information (apart from what is required by any guidelines or
standards) provided by a company in the financial report (Skogsvik, 1998).
Regulatory authorities in Malaysia, like any other country in the world, require companies
to report their financial and non-financial condition in annual reports.  However, companies
are encouraged to report beyond what is required in the Bursa Malaysia listing requirement,
Companies Act, and extant accounting standards. The extent of voluntary disclosure is
particularly important after the adoption of a Disclosure-Based Regime in Malaysia. Under
the new regime, companies are required by the regulatory framework to make full disclosure
of its affairs to the investors that would enable the investors to make informed decision.
The regulator has no right to intervene in the investment decision and company-investors
relationship. Since not all information can be coded into disclosure requirement in the
listing requirement, act and standards, firms are obligated to make voluntary disclosures
of its affairs which are expected to be important for investors’ decisions. This is consistent
with Lang and Lundhom (1996) who suggest that more informative disclosure is associated
with more analysts following and would determine the accuracy of analyst forecast. A
study on voluntary disclosure is particularly more important in MNCs compared to a
company operating locally because the users’ information requirements are more diverse.
Therefore, the main objective of this study was to provide some evidence on the level of
voluntary disclosure of accounting information for the MNCs operated in Malaysia. In
addition to that, the study also attempted to identify some potential factors that might
affect the level of voluntary disclosure for the selected Malaysian MNCs. It is hoped that
this study would shed some light into the issue of voluntary disclosure in the Malaysian
MNCs. The understanding factors affecting voluntary disclosures in the MNCs could
help policy makers to make efforts in order to protect the interest of shareholders.
To our knowledge, this was the first study of the level of and factors that influence
voluntary disclosure in Malaysia after the financial crisis and the launching of Malaysian
Code of Corporate Governance in year 2000 (with an exception to Mohd Ghazali and
Weetman, 2006). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) investigated the relationship between a number
of corporate governance, culture and firm specific characteristics that determine the extent
and scope of voluntary disclosure in year 1995. However, the Code has a large impact on
the governance of companies in Malaysia. This Code outlines some necessary conditions
for the structure and process of the board of directors, audit committee, and auditors in
order to run the business according to the interest of shareholders. This study is different
from Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Mohd Ghazali and Weetman (2006) when the degree of
multinationality is investigated. In addition, we also provide a joint test of the influence of
the degree of multinationality and the number of geographical segments on voluntary
disclosure. We argue that this measure is better than merely looking at the ratio of foreign
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sales to total sales (as suggested in prior literature) because the measure includes the
varieties of users’ information needs as one important determinant of voluntary disclosure,
particularly in multinational companies.
The institutional background is unique in Malaysia where Claessens, Djankov and Lang
(2000) classified firms in Malaysia as having concentrated ownerships, significant family
ownerships and interlocking business relationships.  These factors are not found in other
developed countries, where most voluntary disclosure research studies were conducted
(Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003). In addition, Malaysia also follows International Accounting
Standards (IAS) that only prescribed principles rather than detailed rules. Therefore, IAS
gives managers more discretion to determine the level of voluntary disclosure (compared
to managers in the U.S. and U.K. who have to follow more detailed rules).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, voluntary disclosure
literature is discussed, followed by a section on the research methodology. The results is
presented and discussed in Section IV. Finally, conclusions and suggestions for future
research are presented in the final section.
Literature Review
The determinants of voluntary disclosures most often and consistently identified in the
literature are size of company (Belkaoui, 2001; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989;
Hossain, Perera and Rahman, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Watson, Shrives
and Marston, 2002), audit size or quality (DeAngelo, 1981), types of industry (Cooke,
1989; Meek et al., 1995; Watson et al., 2002), leverage (Hossain et al., 1995) level of
multinationality or internationality (Belkaoui, 2001; Cooke, 1989; Raffournier, 1995),
profitability (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), and ownership concentration (Chau & Gray, 2002;
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). The results of these prior
studies on the voluntary disclosures are summarised in Table 1 below.
Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence, this study examines the potential
association between the level of voluntary information disclosures and the seven firm
characteristics mentioned earlier, i.e. the size of company, audit quality, types of industry,
leverage, level of multinationality or internationality, profitability, and ownership
concentration.
Size of Company
A number of disclosure studies find that size of company is an important factor in explaining
the extent of corporate voluntary disclosures (Hossain et al., 1995). Agency theory
suggests that large companies have higher agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
and thus the theory predicts a positive association between size and the level of voluntary
disclosures. Larger companies are more sensitive to political costs (Watts and Zimmerman,
1986).  First, we expect a positive relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure
and the size of the MNCs because large companies are expected to face additional political
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Table 1: Results of Previous Studies on the Voluntary Disclosures in Annual Report
Authors Country Type of Significant Influence Not Significant
VD (at the 0.05 level) (at the 0.05 level)
Mohd Ghazali Malaysia Voluntary Ownership structure Government, new governance
and Weetman disclosure initiatives and industry
(2006) competitiveness
Chau & Gray Hong Kong Corporate Hong Kong - ownership Singapore – family ownership
(2002) & Singapore voluntary structure; family ownership; Both country - audit size;
disclosure Singapore - ownership leverage; profitability;
structure; size multinationality; industry
Haniffa & Malaysia Voluntary Corporate governance Culture (race; qualification
Cooke (2002) disclosures (family members; non- of BOD; qualification of
executive chairman); Firm- financial controller)
specific characteristics Firm characteristics (leverage,
(size; diversification; auditor type, listing age,
asset-in-place; ownership foreign activities)
structure; profitability)
Watson, Shrives U.K. Accounting Size; industry type Profitability; return &
Marston ratios on investment; gearing;
(2002) company efficiency
Williams Asia-Pacific Environmental Culture; political and Legal system; level of
(1999) Region and social civil system; economic development;
accounting equity market
Hossain, Perera New Zealand All voluntary Size; leverage; foreign Assets-in-place; type of
& Rahman disclosure listing status auditor
(1995)
Meek, Roberts U.S., U.K. & Strategic, non- Size; country/region; Leverage (wrong sign);
& Gray (1995) Continental financial & international listing multinationality;
Europe financial status; industry profitability
(influential in some
cases)
Raffournier Switzerland Voluntary Size, internationality Ownership structure;
(1995) financial leverage; profitability;
disclosure auditor’s size; percentage
of fixed assets; industry
type
Cooke (1989) Sweden Voluntary Size; listing status; Leverage; fixed assets;
corporate Internationality; no. of subsidiaries; parent
disclosure industry type co. relationship; 
Chow & Wong Mexico Voluntary Size Leverage; proportion of
Boren (1987) financial assets in place
disclosure
Firth (1984) Canada Voluntary Leverage; earnings Size; dividend yield
corporate  beta
disclosure
VD = Voluntary disclosure; U.S. = United States of America; U.K. = United Kingdom; BOD = Board of Directors
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costs. Such companies may use voluntary disclosure to disclose more of their operations
and social responsibility efforts in order to reduce the possibility of government intrusions
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Large-sized companies seem likely to respond to regulatory
threats by “voluntarily” increasing their level of disclosure (Craig and Diga, 1998). Larger
sized companies are also predicted to be more complex, producing multi products, and
involved in many geographical areas than smaller sized companies (Cooke, 1989). Larger
sized companies also require more capital and use disclosure to attract more investors
compared to smaller sized companies (Cooke, 1991). Thus, voluntary disclosure is expected
to be higher in larger sized companies compared to smaller sized companies.
Industry
Cooke (1989) found weak evidence that the type of industry affects voluntary disclosure.
The evidence suggests that companies in trading industry disclose less than companies
that belongs to manufacturing and services industries or a conglomerate. Prior studies
suggested that companies from a specific industry might adopt, in addition to mandatory
disclosure practices for companies from all industries, some disclosure practices of their
own (Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari, 2002). Other study that found significant association
between type of industry and the level of voluntary disclosure is Watson et al. (2002).
However, the relationship is not obvious. There are some other studies that found
insignificant relationship between industry type and voluntary information disclosure
such as Chau and Gray (2002) and Raffournier (1995). According to the mimetic institutional
influence argument (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), firms tend to gravitate toward similarity
as a low cost and low risk reaction to environmental uncertainty. This mimetic behaviour
is expected to occur at the industry level. Therefore, although the results are mixed, we
expect that the level of voluntary information disclosures vary across industries.
Leverage
Revealing information would also reduce information asymmetry between the company
and debt holders, which in turn would reduce the cost of capital (Botosan 1997; Firth
1979; Hossain et al. 1995). These costs are higher for firms with proportionally more debt
in their capital structure (Jensen and Meckling 1976) since potential wealth transfers from
debt holders to shareholders and managers increase with leverage. With debt holders
price-protecting themselves, shareholders and managers have the incentives to offer an
increased level of monitoring and voluntarily disclose more information in the published
annual reports to reduce the costs of capital (Hossain et al. 1995). The disclosure would
also contribute to solve monitoring problems between stockholders and creditors
(Raffournier 1995). Thus, a positive relationship between leverage and the level of voluntary
disclosures can be expected. This is consistent with the expectation made in Chow and
Wong-Boren (1987) and Raffournier (1995). Hossain et al. (1995) found a significantly
positive association between leverage and the extent of voluntary disclosure in New
Zealand companies. However, Craig and Diga (1998) found that the sign of correlation
coefficient is positive as expected but not statistically significant for the association
between the corporate accounting disclosure in firms operating in ASEAN countries and
the degree of financial leverage. Therefore, given the mixed results particularly in the case
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of ASEAN countries, it is interesting to explore whether leverage do influence voluntary
disclosure in Malaysia.
Audit Quality
The extent of disclosure is also related to the quality of audit (often proxies by Big-4 or
large auditing firms). Quality auditors are expected to be able to influence managers to
provide more disclosures because they want to maintain their reputations (DeAngelo
1981).  Therefore, we expect to see more disclosure in firms audited by Big-4 auditing
firms and vice versa. However, studies by Chau and Gray (2002), Hossain et al. (1995) and
Raffournier (1995) found that the type of auditor or auditor’s size is not significantly
related to the level of voluntary disclosures. The type of auditor is also not significantly
related with extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of Malaysian listed companies
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). In this study, we wanted to test whether big-4 auditing firms
which expected to be dominant in MNCs, were effective in their monitoring and promote
more voluntary disclosures.
Performance
Impression management is necessary for legitimisation purposes. Future oriented
information would facilitate predictions, valuations and perceptions of the company’s
affair. When the rate of return is high, the managers are motivated to disclose detailed
information in order to support the continuance of their positions and remuneration
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971). Inversely, they may disclose less information in order to conceal
the reasons for losses or declining profits (Raffournier, 1995). Voluntary disclosure may
also be used to signal private information, i.e. when the performance of a company is
under-estimated by the market. The managers may use additional disclosure to improve
capital market valuation of firm stocks (Lev, 1992). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that
profitability, as the performance-related variable is highly significant in relation to the
extent of voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed companies. Therefore, we expect that
MNCs would disclose more information when their performance is good and disclose less
if the performance is bad.
Degree of Multinationality
As companies go multinational, they face new demands for information beyond those
faced in the home country (Meek et al. 1995). It is likely that a company’s presence in
international market will increase its level of disclosure (Craig and Diga, 1998). Much of
the impetus for voluntary disclosures by MNC surrounds the need to raise capital at the
lowest possible cost (capital-need hypothesis). Multiple listed companies often have an
interest in foreign capital markets since foreign operations are often financed by foreign
capital (Choi and Mueller, 1984 in Cooke 1989). Annual reports are also useful to other
users of accounting information such as customers, suppliers and the state (Raffournier,
1995). When these users examine reports of foreign companies, they are likely to refer to
disclosure practices of domestic companies. At the same time, foreign companies are
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induced to comply with the usual practices of countries in which they operate (Raffournier,
1995). The more international the operations of a company, the larger the inducement
would be. Therefore, we expect a positive association between voluntary disclosures and
the degree of multinationality.
Ownership Concentration
Prior research during and before the 1997 financial crisis has found a significant association
between ownership structure and the level of voluntary disclosure in annual reports of
Malaysian companies (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossein et al., 1994) and of companies in
Hong Kong and Singapore (Chau & Gray, 2002; Eng & Mak, 2003). The association is also
found to be significant after the financial crisis for companies in Malaysia (Mohd Ghazali
& Weetman, 2006).
Malaysian PLCs are typically charaterized with high levels of ownership concentration
(Lai, 2004; Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). Haniffa and Cooke (2002) show that this
variable is positively related to voluntary disclosure. However, Hossain et al. (1994)
found a negative association between the proportion of shares held by the 10 largest
shareholders and the extent of voluntary disclosure in annual reports.
Research Methodology
This study used content analysis to determine the level of voluntary information
disclosures and the factors affecting its level by the MNCs. Each section of the selected
companies’ annual reports were analysed and a score was given for each disclosure
made. This study adopted theme analysis using a checklist as suggested by Botosan
(1997). This method was proven to be relevant and reliable in assessing the level of
voluntary information disclosures. An index of voluntary information disclosures was
calculated to represent the level of voluntary disclosures for each of the selected MNC.
Consistent with Meek et al. (1995), we classified a company with at least 10 percent of its
sales is from overseas as a multinational company.
Attention was given on the aspect of voluntary information reported in annual reports for
MNCs listed on Bursa Malaysia. Consistent with Botosan (1997) we assume that the
disclosure provided in annual reports can serve as a good proxy for the level of voluntary
disclosure of information by companies in all disclosure mediums. This is because the
level of voluntary disclosure in annual report is reported as having a positive relationship
to the amount of disclosure made in other media (Lang and Lundholm 1993).
The unit of analysis for this study is the multinational companies listed on the Main
Board of the Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 2003. Annual reports of firms with financial
year ended 2003 were selected because it is the most recent years when the study took
place. The analysis was limited to only one year (2003) because the disclosure policy
used by companies is relatively unchanged through time (Botosan 1997).1 The companies
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are from consumer products, industrial product, trading and services, plantation,
construction, and technology industries.
Annual reports of listed companies on Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 2003 were
analysed to identify companies, which fit the definition of an MNC. According to Meek et
al. (1995), a company with at least 10 percent of sales from non-domestic sources can be
classified as an MNC. The companies that satisfy this 10% foreign sales were further
analysed.
We began the sampling procedure by excluding companies from the financial, banking,
insurance, trust, closed-end funds and securities sectors since these companies are subject
to different rules from other companies in other sectors. Companies in PN4 category
during the time when the study was being carried out were also excluded.2 We only
included companies listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (then Kuala Lumpur
Stock Exchange) since these companies are relatively large compared to the companies
listed on the Second Board, thus they are more likely to have multinational operations.
Finally, we excluded companies under the Mesdaq board i.e. high growth technology
firms from this study because the nature of the operation may have influenced the incentives
for voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital that may cloud interpretations. These
procedures yielded a list of 519 companies.
Therefore, this study included companies from ten industries listed on Bursa Malaysia
i.e. consumer product, industrial product, construction, trading and services, infrastructure
project, hotels, properties, plantation, and technology industries. Audited financial
statements were read and segmental report section was given full attention since most of
the information about foreign activities can be found in the geographical segment section.
From the information, we identified 132 companies that met the definition of an MNC. A
list of the names of selected MNCs is summarized in Appendix A. Table 2 summarizes
these companies according to industry.
Table 2: Summary of MNC Based on Industries
No. Industries Multinational No. of Companies Percentage
1 Consumer Products 27 74 36.5
2 Industrial Products 44 134 32.8
3 Construction 10 43 23.3
4 Trading and Services 22 126 17.5
5 Infrastructure project companies 1 8   12.5*
6 Hotels 0 5  0.0*
7 Properties 11 74   14.9*
8 Plantation 9 38 23.7
9 Mining 1 1      100.0*
10 Technology 7 16 43.8
Total 132 519 25.4
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Based on this initial analysis, there are about 25% of the companies listed on the Main
Board of Bursa Malaysia on 31 December 2003 is classified as MNCs. We selected six
sectors and excluded four other sectors (those being marked ‘*’ in Table 2 above) because
the percentage of companies falls under MNCs for these industries is low (less than 15%).
As for the mining industry, there was only one company listed under the industry on 31
December 2003. This company was excluded although it is a multinational company. We
excluded these firms because the companies are not fairly distributed across industries.
After excluding these firms, each industry was represented by 17.5% to 43.8% MNCs.
These processes yielded 119 companies to be studied. However, only 107 from 119 annual
reports were complete. Table 3 below shows a summary of the sampling selection procedure
used in this study.
Table 3: Summary of Sampling Selection Procedure
Selection Process No. of Companies
Audited financial statements gathered for reviewed (Excluding 519
financial, insurance, trust, closed-end funds, and PN4 companies)
(-) Companies without geographical segment or did not report sales (322)
from abroad
(-) Companies with less than 10% of overseas sales to total sales ratio (65)
Multinational Company 132
(-) Multinational companies from industries with less than 15% of (12)
multinational companies
(-) Mining company (1)
Multinational companies selected for the purpose of this study 119
(-) Incomplete 2003 annual report of the selected multinational companies (12)
No. of Company Selected 107
The data was collected from the annual reports downloaded from the Bursa Malaysia
Web page (http://www.bskl.com.my). All listed companies lodged an English version of
annual report to Bursa Malaysia. However, a few companies also provided a supplement
of Malay version annual report (27 from 107 annual reports or 25%) and only 5% (5 annual
reports) in Chinese.
Dependent Variable
There are variety types of measurements for level of voluntary disclosure that had been
used in previous literature. For the purpose of this study, the measurement for the level of
voluntary disclosure used an index of voluntary information disclosures adopted from
Botosan (1997). This study used the disclosure index as in Botosan (1997) because the
measurement suggested in the study portrays more voluntary disclosure for this sample
of study compared to other instruments used in other past studies. Furthermore, Botosan
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(1997) proves that the measurement is reliable and valid. Annual reports are the main
focus to the disclosure index because generally, the annual report is one of the most
important sources of corporate information (Botosan 1997).
This disclosure index was weighted based on the amount of voluntary disclosure made
by companies in the annual reports. The items for the index were selected following
Botosan (1997) as quoted in Singleton and Globerman (2002). Singleton and Globerman
(2002) provide a more comprehensive list of disclosure items compared to Botosan (1997).
There are five categories for voluntary information disclosure that had been identified by
analysts and investors to be the most important information for decision-making:
1. Background information;
2. Summary of historical results;
3. Key non-financial statistics;
4. Projected information;
5. Management discussion and analysis
Background Information
Information in this category includes objectives and strategy of the business, the industry
environment, the main products produced and the markets served which is useful to
investors. This information is considered as important to the users to interpret other
detailed information about the company. We gave one point for each background
information item disclosed and an additional one point per item if the information provided
includes quantitative data which was not obtainable form the financial statements. The
total score for this first category was 26 points.
Summary of Historical Results
Historical summaries provide useful information (or very important) to the users (Botosan,
1997). Usually, companies present five or ten years of annual data of basic information
necessary to compute profitability ratios such as return-on-assets, net profit margin,
asset turnover and return-on-equity. If a company voluntarily presented a summary of ten
years or more data, it received twice the points compared to a company with five years
data.3 Appendix B shows that this category of information had a maximum of 5 items. We
gave a maximum of 1 point if a company disclosed ten years or more data for item (i) to (iv),
and additional 0.5 points for each item if the company also disclosed five years data.
Therefore, the maximum points for item (i) to (iv) was 6 points. We gave a maximum of 1
point for item (v) if a company disclosed a summary of sales and net income for most
recent eight quarters. In total, the maximum points for this category were 7 points.
Key Non-Financial Statistics
Non-financial information that is not recoverable from the financial statements and related
disclosures provides users with important information. Annual reports should include
company performance statistics and ratios. This non-financial statistics category includes
items such as market share, units sold, order backlog and average compensation/employee.
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Two points were awarded for each non-financial statistic disclosed. The total maximum
score for this third category was 40 points.
Projected Information
Information on the opportunities and risks and management’s future plans is important to
professional investors and analysts. Other than that, information about the forecast of
sales, profits and capital expenditures, and disclosure of future opportunities, risks and
plans are among the items that are included in the index. Two points were given for each
directional prediction and three points for a point estimate. The total maximum score for
this fourth category was 27 points.
Management Discussion and Analysis
Information about the year-to-year changes that is not recoverable from the basic financial
statements is usually included in this section. One point was given to each item discussed
and which provided a detailed explanation not recoverable from financial statements or
footnotes. We assigned one additional point per item if the explanation included
quantitative data which could not be obtained from financial statements or footnotes.
The total score for this final category was 26 points.
Therefore, the maximum score that a company may earn was 126 points. Table 4 below
shows the points that a company would be awarded if it disclosed all of the items in each
of the category discussed above.
Table 4: Summary of the Voluntary Disclosure Scores for Each Category
No. Category Points
1 Background information 26
2 Summary of historical results 7
3 Key non-financial statistics 40
4 Projected information 27
5 Management discussion and analysis 26
Total Maximum Scores 126
Appendix B shows the summary of the major elements of the voluntary disclosure
information. Below is the formula to calculate the voluntary information disclosures index
(VD Score):
VD Score  =
? score earned by a company
? maximum score (126 points)
Independent Variables
One of the main objectives of this paper was also to examine the possible relationship
between the level of voluntary information disclosures and some of the identified MNCs
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characteristics. There are six independent variables in this study. The size of a company,
leverage, level of multinationality, type of industry, type of audit firms and profitability
were all expected to be positively associated with voluntary information disclosures of
the MNCs.
The size of the company was measured using the log of total sales at the end of the
current year. Since the relevance of the selected items of disclosure can vary across
industries (Meek et al., 1995), the level of voluntary disclosures might also vary across
industries. In other words, industry membership may influence the voluntary disclosures.
This variable was measured using the dichotomous value of 0 and 1. Leverage variable
was measured using the ratio of long-term debt to total equity (Craig and Diga, 1998).
The choice of external auditors is a mechanism, which helps to alleviate conflicts between
principals and agents (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). It had been argued that large and
well-known auditing firms might incite companies to disclose more information (Firth,
1979). The dichotomous of 0 and 1 value was used to measure this variable, where ‘1’ if
the company that was being audited by big audit firms such as KPMG, PWCoopers, and
Ernst & Young and “0” otherwise.
Profitable companies have the incentives to distinguish themselves from less profitable
companies in order to raise capital on the best available terms (Meek et al., 1995). One way
to do this is through voluntary information disclosures. Thus, more profitable companies
can be expected to disclose more voluntary information disclosures. This variable was
measured using the ratio of profit to total revenue of the current year.
An increase in the degree of internationalization of operations results in a larger proportion
of foreign stakeholders in the corporation (Meek et al., 1995). The variety of demands can
therefore results in an increased level of voluntary information disclosures. The degree of
multinationality was measured using the ratio of foreign sales to total sales of the current
year (Meek et al., 1995).
We also included ownership concentration in the regression because Haniffa and Cooke
(2002) show that this variable is positively related to voluntary disclosure. However, an
earlier study produces a negative association (Hossain et al., 1994). Based on the argument
that majority largest shareholders in Malaysian listed companies are controlling
shareholders and managers (insiders), they may have the power and incentives to involve
in some expropriation activities (Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006). Consistent with Mohd
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), we expect a negative association between ownership
concentration and voluntary disclosure.
Data Analysis
Descriptive and regression analyses were performed on the data gathered. The equation
for the regression analysis is as follows:
VD Score  = ?0 + ?1SIZE + ?2LEV + ?3MNC + ?4IND1 + ?5IND2 + ?6IND3 +?7IND4 + ?8IND5 + ?9AUDIT + ?10PROFIT + ?11CONCENT + ?
VOLUNTARY ANNUAL REPORT DISCLOSURES BY MALAYSIAN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
141
Where,
VD Score = Voluntary disclosure information index
SIZE = Logarithm of total assets (end of current year – 2003) 
LEV = Logarithm of the ratio of long term debt to total equity 
MNC = Ratio of foreign sales to total sales
IND1 = 1 if the company is from consumer products industry; and 0 otherwise
IND2 = 1 if the company is from industrial products industry; and 0 otherwise
IND3 = 1 if the company is from trading and services industry; and 0 otherwise
IND4 = 1 if the company is from plantations industry; and 0 otherwise
IND5 = 1 if the company is from construction industry; and 0 otherwise
AUDIT = 0 if the company that is audited by small audit firms; and1 if the
company that is audited by big audit firms (KPMG, PWCoopers,
Ernst & Young)
PROFIT = Ratio of profit to sales revenue
CONCENT = The level of ownership concentration i.e. ownership of top 5
shareholders.
? = Error term
Results
Descriptive Analysis
Based on the descriptive analysis carried on the voluntary disclosure information index,
it was found that the overall lowest level was 0.04, whereas the highest was 0.34, and on
average, the level of voluntary disclosure of the MNCs was 0.1076. This level was low i.e.
disclosure level is only at 10-11% from total voluntary disclosures items identified as
important.  In some cases, some most important information was not disclosed. Although
this information is not mandatorily required, past studies show that this type of information
is useful for the investors and analysts.
The breakdown of results however, shows that the background information and summary
of historical results were among the most popular voluntary disclosure information made
by the MNCs. It is found that these two categories had the average scores higher than the
other three categories. This might be due to the fact that this information is normally
presented as the introduction to the annual report. Most companies are found to disclose
their historical results summary by providing at least five years financial information
(1999-2003), and some disclose more than five years information.  For example, Berjaya
Group Berhad presented 16 years results; Cosway Corporation Berhad 15 years; and
Malaysian Airline System Berhad 10 years. However, 8 percent of the 107 companies, did
not disclose any past results summary at all.
On the other hand, the least popular category of voluntary information disclosed is the
projected information, key non-financial statistics, and management discussion and
analysis. Table 5 shows a summary of the descriptive results for the voluntary disclosures
information.
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Independent Variables
The independent variables that are in the form of ratio and nominal value, the results of
descriptive analysis are summarized in Table 6. From the descriptive analysis, it is found
that the mean for the size of company (log of total sales) is 19.29 and the standard
deviation is approximately 1.45.
Table 5: Results of Descriptive Analysis for Voluntary Disclosure Index
No. Category Min Max Range Mean Standard
deviation
1 Background information 0.08 0.62 0.54 0.25 0.12
2 Summary of historical results 0.00 0.57 0.57 0.24 0.11
3 Key non-financial statistics 0.00 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.01
4 Projected information 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00
5 Management discussion and 0.08 0.31 0.23 0.13 0.01
analysis
Total (Overall) 0.04 0.34 0.30 0.11 0.00
Table 6: Results of Descriptive Analysis for the Independent Variables
No. Category Minimum Maximum Range Mean Standard
deviation
1 Size of company 15.57 22.88 7.31 19.49 1.44
2 Leverage -16.12 7.06 23.17 2.44 3.56
3 Level of multinationality 0.11 1.00 0.89 0.45 0.26
4 Profitability -2.50 1.68 4.18 0.06 0.43
5. Ownership concentration 0.04 0.83 0.79 0.48 0.19
Meanwhile, the average logarithm of the ratio of long-term debt to total equity (leverage)
was 2.43. As for the level of multinational (foreign sales to total sales ratio), the lowest
level was 11.4 percent, and 3 out of the 107 companies had a ratio of 100% foreign sales in
the year 2003 (i.e. Southern Steel Berhad; Tong Herr Resources Berhad; and Uchi
Technologies Berhad).
Meanwhile, for the profitability ratio (i.e. profit to total assets ratio), a small average value
of 0.7% was recorded due to the losses made by many of the selected companies for the
financial year ended 2003. Most of the companies reported the event of war in Iraq and
SARS outbreak in Asia region were the main factors that affect the profitability of the
companies. However, when we compared the profitability of these companies in year 2003
to reported figures in year 2004 and 2005, the difference in the profitability ratio was not
statistically significant (t-statistics = 0.461). We conclude that although there is a concern
whether the chosen period (year 2003) would reflect the normal condition of the MNCs,
the stated events were proven not to be the main reason for their poor performance. The
performance of MNCs remained unchanged materially in year 2004 and 2005.
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Results of Correlation Analysis
Based on the correlation analysis, it is found that the relationship between level of voluntary
disclosure information and several determinant factors exists. Factors such as size of
company and size of audit firms are found to be positively and significantly related with
the level of voluntary disclosure. Meanwhile, other factors are not significantly related.
Table 7 summarizes the results of the correlation analysis.
Table 7: Correlation Analysis between Voluntary Disclosure Factors and Index
No. Variables Expected Signs Correlation
1 Size of company +      0.287**
2 Leverage + -0.112
3 Level of multinational +   0.154
4 Type of industry ?
IND1  - 0.145
IND2 0.003
IND3 -0.069
IND4 0.106
IND5  0.046
5 Size of audit firm + 0.211*
6 Profitability + 0.012
7 Ownership concentration - 0.089
IND1 = consumer products; IND2 = industrial products; IND3 = trading and services; IND4 =
plantations industry; IND5 = construction
Results of Regression Analysis
Table 8 reports the regression results for the voluntary information disclosure index and
for each of the five-information category. Overall, the results are statistically significant
for the voluntary disclosure index model (voluntary disclosure index as dependent variable)
and in the voluntary summary of history information model (voluntary summary of history
information as dependent variable).
The amount of explained variation in disclosure ranges from about 4.1% in the case of key
non-financial information to 17.1% for summary of historical results. The adjusted R² for
voluntary information disclosures overall is approximately 10.7%. This might suggests
that there are other factors that may explain the variation in voluntary disclosure which
need to be further analysed.  However, this study only investigated whether there was
any association between the factors discussed in the literature review section and
voluntary disclosure of MNCs in Malaysia, rather than the determinants of voluntary
disclosure of those companies. Therefore, such low adjusted R2 was not a concern.
Overall, it can be seen that the voluntary disclosure index model (column 6) is significant
with F-value of 2.267 and p = 0.020.  Company size and quality audit (the type of audit firm)
are two most important variables in explaining the level of voluntary disclosure in our
sample. Consistent with previous empirical studies, larger MNCs voluntarily disclosed
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significantly more annual report information than smaller MNCs (Meek et al., 1995).
However, when voluntary disclosure index is splitted into five categories, the size
phenomenon only holds for three out of the five categories of information, i.e. background
information, summary of historical results and management discussion and analysis. This
result is consistent with other disclosures studies such as Meek et al. (1995), Raffournier
(1995), and Hossain et al. (1995) when they found that the factors explaining voluntary
annual report disclosures differed by information types.
Table 8: Regression Resultsa
Background Summary Key non- Projected Management Overall
Information of History Financial Information Discussion Voluntary
Results & Analysis Disclosure
R² 0.163 0.236 0.143 0.181 0.161 0.207
Adjusted R² 0.066 0.148 0.044 0.086 0.064 0.116
F Statistic 1.685 2.668 1.442 1.907 1.658 2.260
Significance 0.088* 0.005*** 0.167 0.048** 0.095* 0.017**
Intercept -0.110 -0.263* -0.110 -0.063 -0.071 -0.100
(-0.700) (-1.854) (-1.617) (-1.068) (-0.998) (-1.647)
Independent Variables:
Size 0.019** 0.027*** 0.006 0.004 0.009** 0.010***
(2.377) (3.715) (1.589) (1.176) (2.596) (3.177)
Leverage 0.005* -0.001 0.001 -0.002* 0.002 0.001
(1.681) (0.359) (0.556) (1.692) (1.531) (1.065)
Multinational -3.0E-04 3.8E-04 2.4-04 3.7E-04** 1.5E-04 1.4E-04
(0.664) (0.935) (1.216) (2.176) (0.734) (0.823)
Industry
IND1 -0.099* -0.064 -0.007 -0.035* -0.010 -0.036*
(-1.970) (-1.414) (-0.298) (-1.879) (-0.433) (1.830)
IND2 -0.060 -0.056 -0.003 -0.012 0.001 -0.019
(-1.262) (-1.300) (-0.132) (0.653) (0.040) (-1.013)
IND3 -0.127** -0.016 -0.003 -0.011 0.014 -0.028
(-2.056) (-0.292) (-0.126) (-0.481) (0.488) (-1.161)
IND4 -0.070 -0.027 -0.005 -0.009 0.010 -0.017
(-1.358) (-0.583) (-0.220) (-0.469) (0.424) (-0.872)
IND5 -0.085 -0.115* 0.039 -0.006 0.009 -0.011
(-1.298) (-1.945) (1.370) (-0.241) (0.315) (-0.432)
Audit Firm 0.043* 0.010 0.019* 0.012 0.018* 0.022**
(1.818) (0.478) (1.850) (1.377) (1.711) (2.381)
Profitability -0.018 -0.024 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.004
(-0.611) (-0.871) (0.044) (-0.274) (0.707) (-0.310)
Ownership 0.067 0.012 0.028 0.029 -0.010 0.028
Concentration (1.121) (0.217) (1.100) (1.283) (-0.356) (1.195)
aIND1 = consumer products; IND2 = industrial products; IND3 = trading and services; IND4 = plantations;
IND5 = construction. Other variables are as previously defined. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively (2-tailed).
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Most previous voluntary disclosure studies, did not find any significant relationship
between type of audit or audit quality with the level of voluntary disclosure (e.g. Chau
and Gray, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Hossain et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995). However,
this study found that the type of audit firm was significantly related with the voluntary
disclosure index model. The result suggests that the level of voluntary disclosure was
more in companies audited by the big audit firms. However, the type of audit firm was not
significant in explaining each category of voluntary disclosure.
Meanwhile, the leverage, industry, profitability and the degree of multinationality do not
appear to be significant in explaining voluntary annual report disclosures for our samples
of companies. However, some of the variables are significant within a certain type of
information disclosures (i.e. multinationality and industry type). On an overall basis, the
level of multinationality was significantly related to the disclosure of projected information.
Meek et al. (1995) also found that the level of multinationality was weakly related to the
disclosure of non-financial and financial information subgroups. In this study, the more
multinational an MNC is, the more projected information it disclosed (but unrelated to
company size and type of auditor).
There were industry type patterns in two of the five information categories. Overall, the
industry type was not significantly related to the level of voluntary disclosures. However,
it was statistically significant in some categories of voluntary information disclosure. For
instance, within background information, two of the six industries (i.e. consumer products;
and trading and services) were negatively related to the level of voluntary disclosure of
such information. Meanwhile, the construction industry was negatively related to the
level of voluntary disclosure of the summary of history results. The negative relationship
suggests that these MNCs in the particular industries seem particularly inclined to provide
such information. This result is consistent with Meek et al. (1995) where the industry type
was found to be influential to the level of voluntary disclosures in some case (companies
in the oil, chemicals and mining industry seem particularly inclined to provide non-financial
information).
While leverage appears to be an important explanatory variable in other studies (e.g.
Hossain et al., 1995), this study found no significant association between leverage and
the level of voluntary disclosures. The insignificance of leverage was also found in Chau
and Gray (2002), Chow and Wong Boren (1987), Cooke (1989) and Raffournier(1995).
Finally, we find no evidence that voluntary disclosure behaviour was different between
various levels of MNCs profitability. This insignificant result is consistent with Chau and
Gray (2002), Watson et al. (2002), Meek et al. (1995), and Raffournier (1995).
Additional Analyses
We conducted several additional analyses. First, we conducted regressions to see whether
influential observations might affect the distribution of the data which in turn could affect
the result.  In this regression, all continuous variables were transformed into ranks (Cooke,
1998).  The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 8. Winsorizing the
observations to the point equivalent to top and bottom 5% of the ranked data also did not
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 6 NO. 1, 2007
146
change the result significantly. Second, we changed the measurement of several
independent variables from revenues or sales to total assets to see whether the result is
stable if we use alternative measure of size.  In this regression we defined LEV as debt to
total assets, MNC ratio of foreign sales to total assets and PROFIT as the ratio of profit to
total assets. The results did not change our conclusion. However, using the new
measurement reduced the adjusted R2 in all regressions significantly.
We also provide an additional test on the measure of multinationality. In our opinion, if
a company had a high ratio of foreign sales and sold their product to many foreign
countries (the number of geographical segments), it had to be given a high score on the
degree of multinationality, and vice versa.  The number of foreign countries where the
products are sold was important since more varieties of users were interested to know
about the company, and thus the demand for more disclosure was higher than if the
company was involved in one foreign country. Therefore, we used a variable which was
a product of the ratio of foreign sales and the number of foreign countries where the
products were sold, to test this concern. The results are presented in Table 9. We found
that while the significance levels of variables were qualitatively similar to those presented
in Table 8, the new measure of multinationality (MNCGEO) was significantly positively
related to voluntary disclosure index at less than 5% level. It was positively related to
disclosure of projected information, key non-financial information and summary of
history results.
Table 9: Additional Analysesa
Background Summary Key non- Projected Management Overall
Information of History Financial Information Discussion Voluntary
Results & Analysis Disclosure
R² 0.161 0.260 0.196 0.181 0.163 0.238
Adjusted R² 0.064 0.174 0.103 0.087 0.066 0.150
F Statistic 1.656 3.027 2.106 1.913 1.681 2.703
Significance 0.096* 0.002*** 0.027** 0.047** 0.089** 0.005**
Intercept -0.101 -0.242* -0.096 -0.055 -0.067 -0.090
(-0.637) (-1.728) (-1.451) (-0.938) (-0.942) (-1.507)
Independent Variables:
Size 0.017** 0.025*** 0.004 0.003 0.009** 0.009***
(2.081) (3.399) (1.135) (1.054) (2.496) (2.805)
Leverage 0.006* -0.001 0.001 -0.002* 0.002 0.001
(1.786) (-0.438) (0.490) (1.925) (1.474) (1.042)
MNGEO 0.003 0.015* 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.007**
(0.415) (1.980) (2.800) (2.189) (0.866) (2.137)
Industry
IND1 -0.087* -0.048 -0.005 -0.032* -0.008 -0.028
(-1.687) (1.051) (-0.222) (-1.666) (-0.331) (-1.4.9)
Cont’d
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Conclusion
Overall, it was found that the level of voluntary disclosure was at a relatively low for the
MNCs in Malaysia although it was expected that these MNCs would disclose more
voluntary disclosure in overcoming the diversity demand of information. The results
show that level of voluntary information disclosures was positively related to size of the
company and the type of audit. Meanwhile, the level of multinationality was significantly
related to the level of projected information disclosures. We also found MNCs in particular
industries (e.g. construction industry) seemed particularly inclined to provide certain
information (e.g. summary of history results). Additional tests show that the level of
multinationality and the number of countries where the products were exported jointly
determine the level of voluntary disclosure in MNCs.
There are several limitations to this study. For instance, most of the companies listed on
Bursa Malaysia which were found to satisfy the 10% foreign sales to total sales ratio (a
criteria for MNC as set by Meek et al., 1995), have Malaysia as its home county, which was
not expected. It was initially thought that the MNCs would have its parents companies
overseas, and Malaysia as the host country. Only a few companies (about 3 companies
only) stated that their home country was abroad. Due to this limitation, a study to examine
the possible influential factors of voluntary disclosure such as culture, political and civil
system, legal system and level of economic development of home countries cannot be
preceded. It is important that future studies be able to look into these factors, because the
differences in culture, political and civil system, legal system and level of economic
development between home and host country may have some relationship which might
explain the behaviour of the reporting and disclosing the accounting information.
The amount of explained variation in disclosure ranges from about 4.1% in the case of key
non-financial information to a maximum of 17% for summary of historical results. The
adjusted R² for overall voluntary information disclosures is approximately 11%. Results
IND2 -0.048 -0.041 -0.007 -0.009 0.003 -0.011
(-1.995) (-0.957) (-0.367) (-0.492) (0.124) (-0.611)
IND3 -0.107* -0.004 -0.011 -0.009 0.016 -0.017
(-1.708) (0.080) (-0.423) (-0.378) 0.556) (-0.715)
IND4 -0.062 -0.019 -0.001 -0.008 0.011 -0.013
(-1.194) (-0.417) (-0.033) (-0.435) (0.455) (-0.674)
IND5 -0.071 -0.097 0.051* -0.002 0.012 -0.002
(-1.063) (-1.638) (1.850) (-0.090) (0.392) (-0.067)
Audit Firm 0.043* 0.007 0.017* 0.010 0.017 0.020**
(1.812) (0.319) (1.676) (1.148) (1.625) (2.254)
Profitability -0.018 -0.024 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.003
(-0.587) (-0.878) (0.057) (-0.295) (0.703) (-0.304)
Ownership 0.068 0.024 0.036 0.035 -0.007 -0.033
Concentration (1.136) (0.445) (1.447) (1.560) (-0.247) (1.452)
***, **, * Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level, respectively (2-tailed).
Cont’d Table 9: Additional Analysesa
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of additional test utilizing an alternative measure of multinationality show the adjusted R²
ranges from 6.4% to 17.4%. This low explanatory power suggests that there are obviously
additional factors influencing the voluntary disclosures. Other potential explanatory
variables to examine include the possible uniqueness of the MNCs as compared to other
domestically operated companies. These possible unique characteristics of MNCs (yet to
be identified) could be modelled for its impact on voluntary disclosures of the MNCs.
Another limitation is that like most previous disclosure studies, this study had focused
on one form of disclosure medium, i.e. the annual reports. Although the disclosures
provided in the annual reports is assumed to serve as a good proxy for the level of
voluntary disclosure of information by companies in all disclosure mediums, future research
could extent this to include other channels of disclosure, such as interim reports,
preliminary announcement to stock exchange, press release, etc. Other than that, this
study has examined the level of voluntary disclosures cross-sectionally using 2003 data
and thus more robust results can be obtained from longitudinal studies.
Notes
1 We did not use observations prior to year 2003 because during those years most
companies were badly hit by Asian financial crisis which started in 1997 and still
struggling to survive. At the time the research was conducted (year 2005), year 2003
was the most recent year with all available data.
2 PN4 is Practice Note 4. Only distressed companies are listed under the PN4 category.
Companies under this category may have different incentives for disclosure.
Managers of these companies may have the incentives to justify their position, or to
lobby for government aid by disclosing more information.
3 We also gave twice the score if the company discloses a summary of historical
results for the maximum number of years possible, for firms established for less than
10 years
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APPENDIX A
The List of Selected MNCs
No. Name of Company Listing Industry Multinational
Date Type Level (%)
1 AIC Corporation Bhd 14/12/1994 TECH 82.7
2 AKN Technology Bhd 2/9/1998 TECH 77.4
3 Aluminium Company of 20/12/1969 IP 39.1
Malaysia Bhd
4 Amalgamated Containers Bhd 28/10/1993 IP 21.4
5 Amsteel Corporation Bhd 13/1/1983 IP 50.8
6 Ancom Bhd 29/3/1990 IP 48.9
7 Antah Holdings Bhd 28/11/1983 TS 47.2
8 APL Industries Bhd 8/9/1992 IP 18.9
9 Apollo Food Holdings Bhd 25/9/1996 CP 50.7
10 Asia File Corporation Bhd 4/3/1996 CP 58.8
11 Baneng Holdings Bhd 25/3/2002 CP 23.3
12 Batu Kawan Bhd 12/10/1971 PL 15.0
13 Berjaya Group Bhd 13/2/1969 TS 49.1
14 Bintai Kinden Corporation Bhd 23/1/1998 TS 20.5
15 Brem Holdings Bhd 23/6/1993 CN 29.2
16 Chin Well Holdings Bhd 10/3/1970 IP 47.6
17 Coastal Contracts Bhd 13/8/2003 IP 14.4
18 Cosway Corporation Bhd 24/10/1990 CP 32.2
19 Dai Hwa Holdings (M) Bhd 6/10/1995 CP 50.0
20 DNP Holdings Bhd 17/1/1979 CP 69.5
21 Eng Teknologi Holdings Bhd 8/7/1993 TECH 77.1
22 Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd 3/8/1970 CP 13.6
23 General Corporation Bhd 14/1/1971 CN 15.9
24 Gold IS Bhd 17/6/1993 CP 33.8
25 Golden Pharos Bhd 13/9/1993 CP 49.9
26 Grand United Holdings Bhd 17/12/1968 IP 38.8
27 Ho Wah Genting Bhd 28/12/1994 IP 70.4
28 Hytex Integrated Bhd 8/11/2002 CP 16.6
29 IJM Corporation Bhd 29/9/1986 CN 16.8
30 Ingress Corporation Bhd 9/3/2001 IP 18.1
31 Intan Utilities Bhd 2/7/1997 TS 38.5
32 Integrated Logistic Bhd 15/7/1993 TS 19.5
33 IOI Corporation Bhd 28/7/1980 PL 67.7
34 Jerasia Capital Bhd 10/11/1993 CP 77.9
35 Johan Holdings Bhd 2/8/1973 TS 90.7
36 Keck Seng (M) Bhd 26/5/1977 IP 15.1
Cont’d
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37 Ken Holdings Bhd 22/5/1996 CN 17.6
38 KFC Holdings (M) Bhd 11/11/1988 TS 26.9
39 Kim Hin Industry Bhd 22/7/1992 IP 15.2
40 Kinta Kellas PLC 28/5/1974 TS 80.8
41 Kluang Rubber Co (M) Bhd 6/4/1961 PL 11.4
42 Kretam Holdings Bhd 18/1/1989 PL 36.6
43 Kulim (M) Bhd 14/11/1975 PL 61.6
44 Kumpulan Fima Bhd 15/11/1996 TS 21.5
45 Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd 25/8/1989 PL 60.5
46 Leader Universal Holdings Bhd 25/8/1978 IP 41.3
47 Leong Hup Holdings Bhd 29/10/1990 CP 28.9
48 Linear Corporation Bhd 18/11/1994 IP 39.9
49 Lion Diversified Holdings Bhd 11/2/1982 CP 91.2
50 Lityan Holdings Bhd 1/3/1994 TECH 19.0
51 LKT Industrial Bhd 12/6/1995 TECH 54.4
52 Malayan Flour Mill Bhd 7/10/1968 CP 22.0
53 Malayan United Industries Bhd 30/6/1971 TS 80.3
54 MISCBhd 2/3/1987 TS 53.9
55 Malaysia Smelting Corp Bhd 15/12/1994 IP 44.2
56 Malaysian AE Models Holdings Bhd 26/5/1999 IP 12.9
57 Malaysian Airline System Bhd 14/12/1985 TS 83.5
58 Matsushita Electric Co (M) Bhd 14/12/1966 CP 51.0
59 Measat Global Bhd 1/7/1978 TS 25.9
60 Mechmar Corporation (M) Bhd 17/1/1986 TS 88.8
61 Mega First Corporation Bhd 11/8/1970 TS 59.7
62 Meico Chipboard Bhd 26/5/1998 IP 15.1
63 Muda Holdings Bhd 2/11/1984 IP 12.5
64 Muhibbah Engineering (M) Bhd 25/2/1994 CN 18.0
65 Mulpha International Bhd 30/11/1983 TS 43.2
66 Nestle (M) Bhd 13/12/1989 CP 17.0
67 NTPM Holdings Bhd 25/4/2003 CP 29.0
68 Nylex (M) Bhd 17/12/1990 IP 54.9
69 Oriental Holdings Bhd 10/3/1964 CP 56.4
70 Paracorp Bhd 7/5/1997 IP 20.6
71 PDZ Holdings Bhd 5/7/1996 TS 26.3
72 Pentamaster Corporation Bhd 23/7/2003 TECH 36.7
73 Pernas International Holdings Bhd 25/9/1990 TS 16.4
74 Pilecon Engineering Bhd 27/12/1984 CN 49.3
75 Pohmay Holdings Bhd 12/3/1997 CP 89.7
76 Polymate Holdings Bhd 29/4/1997 IP 13.6
77 PPB Group Bhd 30/3/1972 CP 65.4
78 PPB Oil Palms Bhd 12/8/1997 PL 12.3
79 Ramatex Bhd 12/11/1996 IP 45.4
Cont’d The List of Selected MNCs
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80 Rohas-Euco Industries Bhd 16/3/1995 IP 15.6
81 Silverstone Corporation Bhd 25/7/1991 CP 77.9
82 Sime Darby Bhd 28/12/1979 TS 62.0
83 Sinora Industries Bhd 3/7/1996 IP 81.2
84 Southern Acids (M) Bhd 23/8/1991 IP 70.7
85 Southern Steel Bhd 17/12/1993 IP 100.0
86 Subur Tiasa Holdings Bhd 27/11/1997 IP 83.2
87 Sungei Bagan Rubber Co (M) Bhd 18/4/1961 PL 27.0
88 Supermax Corporation Bhd 7/8/2000 IP 38.0
89 Ta Ann Holdings Bhd 23/11/1999 IP 91.8
90 Tekala Corporation Bhd 28/8/1996 IP 70.0
91 Texchem Resources Bhd 17/5/1993 TS 53.3
92 Thong Guan Industries Bhd 19/12/1997 IP 56.6
93 Tong Herr Resources Bhd 3/11/1999 IP 100.0
94 Top Glove Corporation Bhd 27/3/2001 IP 12.7
95 Tradewinds (M) Bhd 23/8/1988 CP 23.9
96 TSH Resources Bhd 31/1/1994 IP 85.6
97 UAC Bhd 13/7/1966 IP 16.3
98 Uchi Technologies Bhd 19/7/2000 IP 100.0
99 UEM Builders Bhd 1/11/1990 CN 25.8
100 Unisem (M) Bhd 30/7/1998 TECH 90.8
101 UPA Corporation Bhd 5/3/1997 CP 37.9
102 V.S. Industry Bhd 15/6/1998 IP 56.2
103 Versatile Creative Bhd 11/1/1991 IP 20.3
104 Wah Seong Corporation Bhd 19/9/1991 IP 37.5
105 Ye Chiu Metal Smelting Bhd 12/9/1996 IP 18.9
106 Yeo Hiap Seng (M) Bhd 9/5/1975 CP 22.5
107 YTL Corporation Bhd 3/4/1985 CN 46.1
Cont’d The List of Selected MNCs
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APPENDIX B
Summary of the Major Elements of Voluntary Disclosure
Score
1.  Background Information: (Maximum 13 items x 2points = 26 points)
i. Statement of corporate goals or objectives is provided
ii. A statement of corporate strategy is provided
iii. Action taken during the year to achieve the corporate goal is discussed
iv. Planned actions to be taken in future years are discussed
v. A time frame for achieving corporate goals is provided
vi. Barriers to entry are discussed
vii. Impact of barriers to entry on future profits is discussed
viii. The competitive environment is discussed
ix. The impact of competition on future profits is discussed
x. A general description of the business is provided
xi. The principle products produced are identified
xii. Specific characteristics of these products are described
xiii. The principle markets are identified
2. Ten- or Five-Year Summary of Historical Results: (Maximum item (i) to (iv) x 1.5 points
+ item (v) x 1 point = 7 points)
i. Return-on-assets or sufficient information to compute return-on-assets (i.e. net income, tax
rate, interest expense and total assets) is provided
ii. Net profit margin or sufficient information to compute net profit margin (i.e. net income, tax
rate, interest expense and sales) is provided
iii. Asset turnover or sufficient information to compute asset turnover (i.e. sales and total
assets) is provided
iv. Return-on-equity or sufficient information to compute return-on equity (i.e. net income and
stockholder equity) is provided
v. Summary of sales and net income for most recent eight quarters is provided
3. Key Non-Financial Statistics: (Maximum 20 items x 2 points = 40 points)
i. Number of employees
ii. Average compensation per employee
iii. Order backlog
iv. Percentage of order backlog to be shipped next year
v. Percentage of sales in products designed in the last five years
vi. Market share
vii. Dollar amount of new orders laced this year
viii. Unit sold
ix. Unit selling price
x. Growth in units sold
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xi. Rejection/defect rates
xii. Production lead-time
xiii. Age of key employees
xiv. Sales growth in key regions not reported as geographic segments
xv. Break-even sales
xvi. Volume of materials consumed
xvii. Prices of materials consumed
xviii. Ratio of inputs to outputs
xix. Average age of key employees
xx. Growth in sales of key products not reported as product segments
4. Projected Information: (Maximum 9 items x 3 points = 27 points)
i. A comparison of previous earnings projections to actual earnings is provided
ii. A comparison of previous sales projections to actual sales is provided
iii. The impact of opportunities available to the firm on future sales or profits is discussed
iv. The impact of risks facing the firm on future sales or profit is discussed
v. A forecast of market share is provided
vi. A cash flow projection is provided
vii. A projection of capital expenditures and/or R&D expenditure is provided
viii. A projection of future profits is provided
ix. A projection of future sales is provided 
5. Management Discussion and Analysis (explanations for change is provided): (Maximum
13 items x 2 points = 26 points)
i. Change in sales
ii. Change in operating income
iii. Change in cost of goods sold
iv. Change in cost of goods sold as a percentage of sales
v. Change in gross profit
vi. Change in gross profit as a percentage of sales
vii. Change in selling and administrative expense
viii. Change in interest expense or interest income
ix. Change in net income
x. Change in inventory
xi. Change in account receivable
xii. Change in capital expenditures of R&D
xiii. Change in market share
(Source: Botosan, 1997 as quoted in Singleton and Globerman, 2002)
